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Abstract  
Devolution introduced new local-level political offices in order to transform Kenyan politics by 
reducing the high stakes around the presidential race. The controversy over the 2017 presidential 
election rerun, however, saw pressure on county-level politicians to support either the ruling 
party or opposition coalition, underlining the important intersection between national and 
county politics. Using a broadened definition of ‘political linkages’, this paper explores the 
logics shaping how and why county-level politicians responded to the rerun as they did, 
comparing ruling party and opposition areas. Different forms of linkage politics indicate that 
devolution’s effect on central power is not uniform across counties, challenging the view that 
devolution simply leads to a recentralisation of power. The reproduction of national partisan 
divides at the county level suggests that devolution’s effect on central power is contingent partly 
on the way that national and county political alliances intersect. Given Kenya’s fluid national 
electoral alliances, devolution’s effect on central power is therefore not stable and may change 
with each electoral cycle. 
 
Key words: Elections; constitutional and institutional reform; devolution; political linkage; 
Mombasa; Kisumu; Kenya  
 
On 1 September 2017 the Kenyan Supreme Court nullified the 8 August presidential election 
in which the incumbent, President Uhuru Kenyatta, had been declared winner. In the 
following days, both the ruling Jubilee Party and the National Super Alliance (NASA) 
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opposition coalition began preparing for the fresh elections. However, by early October, both 
parties’ presidential candidates, Kenyatta and Raila Odinga, were at odds over what should 
happen. Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto were mobilising for the vote to go ahead, 
emphasising the country’s imperilled state without a stable presidency. NASA was rejecting 
the credibility of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) and 
advocating for electoral reforms through street protests.1 Significantly, this divide did not 
only occur at the level of national politics. During the period from the court ruling to the 
presidential rerun on 26 October, county-level politicians, many of whom had been elected to 
lower-level seats, were under pressure to mobilise support for a rerun or a boycott.2 Odinga 
withdrew from the race on 10 October, but the rerun went ahead. Kenyatta received 98% of 
the vote share on a 39% turnout, low by Kenyan standards but respectably high for an 
effectively uncontested election.3  
The 2017 election was the second to take place under Kenya’s devolved constitution. 
Devolution was partly designed to ‘transform Kenyan politics’ by reducing the saliency of 
the presidential race around election times.4 Devolving power to sub-national political units 
sought to reduce the attractions of the presidency such that the blow of ‘losing nationally’ 
would be softened by ‘winning locally’.5 However, the role of county-level politicians during 
the 2017 presidential poll suggests a more complex relationship between national and county 
politics. The rerun offers an opportunity to consider devolution’s impact on the saliency of 
the presidency and on central power. During the rerun, no county-level politicians were on 
the ballots. Therefore, their roles in the rerun highlight the significance of the presidency 
absent county-level elections. Second, as Odinga withdrew and Kenyatta’s win was assured, 
the rerun allows for a comparison of counties facing different political relationships with the 
centre. To understand why county-level politicians responded to the rerun as they did, this 
article uses the concept of ‘political linkages’, conventionally understood as how politicians 
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appeal to voters.6 I complicate its use in two ways. First, I add a focus on the roles played by 
intermediary politicians in devolution’s multi-layered political landscape.7 Second, I go 
beyond clientelist linkages to explore alternative ways in which politicians seek to be seen as 
responsive to voters, especially in defending community interests.8  
The positions county-level politicians took during the rerun were mainly refracted 
through allegiances that linked presidential and county campaigns during the election period 
ahead of the August vote. Campaigns for county-level races (governors, senators, women’s 
representatives, members of parliament [MPs] and members of county assemblies [MCAs]) 
had typically been publicly affiliated with either the Jubilee or NASA presidential campaigns. 
After the court ruling, county-level politicians tended to either support Kenyatta and the rerun 
or align with Odinga and oppose it. This pattern was most obvious in the parties’ respective 
strongholds: the former provinces of Central and much of Rift Valley for Jubilee, and 
Nyanza, Coast and parts of Western for NASA. Working on the assumption that Kenyatta 
would be declared winner again, the material benefits of aligning with the incumbents were 
prominent campaign messages in Jubilee-aligned counties. In NASA counties, the post-
election links with Odinga’s presidential campaign were less robust. First, lacking resources 
and popular enthusiasm for another campaign, many counties focused on forming their own 
governments, thus demonstrating how the devolution of power has drawn attention away 
from the presidential race. Second, however, in some NASA counties, county-level 
politicians played an active role in resisting the presidential rerun, mobilising on communal 
narratives of injustice. This paper will focus on Mombasa and Kisumu.9 
Different linkage appeals indicate that devolution’s effect on central power is not 
uniform. This article challenges the dominant view among Africanist scholars, expressed 
most clearly by Catherine Boone, that decentralisation leads to the recentralisation of power. 
10   Instead, it adds to the view that Kenya is a ‘deviant’ case in the African context.11 
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Jubilee’s effective use of its county-level politicians demonstrates that devolution offers 
presidential incumbents opportunities to strengthen their position when national-county 
political interests align. However, in opposition counties, the fruits of genuine devolved 
power, along with the more active role of some county-level politicians to subvert the rerun, 
suggest that devolved offices can provide either autonomy from the political centre or a 
platform to challenge it directly. The reproduction of national partisan divides at the county 
level, however, suggests that devolution’s effect on central power is contingent partly on the 
way that national and county political alliances intersect. Given Kenya’s fluid national 
electoral alliances, devolution’s effect on central power is therefore not stable and may 
change with each electoral cycle.  
The empirical data here was collected over several months – from January 2017 to 
November 2017, and in June 2018. Interviews with Nairobi-based analysts, journalists and 
diplomats, along with my participation in an electoral observation mission, helped to build a 
nationwide picture of the presidential election campaigns and links with county-level races.12 
I correlated these insights with the media sources referenced in this article. More in-depth 
interviews were conducted in Mombasa and Kisumu with county-level politicians, grassroots 
campaigners, civil society actors and journalists. Respondents were often at the forefront of 
organising or participating in the resistance around the rerun, providing a granular view of 
what happened, and their interpretations of the reasons why. The article begins by discussing 
how political linkages are useful for understanding variation in county-level politicians’ roles 
during the rerun. Their responses reveal diverse patterns of political mobilisation and 
highlight the differentiated effect of Kenya’s decentralisation on central power. The article 
then moves to the empirical discussion. The first half focuses on the ways in which county-
level politicians in Jubilee areas sought to mobilise the vote for the rerun. The second half 
takes a closer look at the opposition, and specifically why county-level politicians in 
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Mombasa and Kisumu played particular roles in resisting the rerun. The article ends by 
discussing devolution’s effect on central power and presidential elections in Kenya. 
 
Political linkages and devolution  
A powerful executive presidency has been a defining feature of Kenya since independence. 
Since the return to multi-party politics in 1991, powers vested in the national executive have, 
at every election, encouraged winner-takes-all contests in the presidential race.13 
Consequently, elections in Kenya are times of considerable national stress and often marked 
by violence. The post-election violence of 2007-08 forced a political reckoning and 
widespread calls for the state’s structure to be reformed to dilute centralised power.14 The 
post-conflict settlement included a new constitution, passed by popular referendum in August 
2010.15 This constitution introduced one of the most significant transformations to Kenya’s 
institutional geography: formal devolution of the state.16 Forty-seven county governments 
replaced the local government system and created four new types of political office: 
governor, senator, women’s representative and MCA, to join the existing offices of the 
president and MP.17 Access to local political offices was intended to ensure that the 
presidency was not the only electoral prize. The relative lack of violence during the 2013 
elections, the first under the new system, was seen, in part, to be a result of the local access to 
resources offered by the new offices.18 However, four years later, the pressure on county-
level politicians during the more controversial 2017 presidential election challenges the 
assumption that devolution’s effect is simply to reduce competition for the central power 
vested in the presidency. 
Scholars of decentralisation in sub-Saharan Africa are skeptical that such reforms 
curb central power. Many have argued that decentralisation is actually a form of 
recentralisation.19 Boone’s research finds that decentralisation is often a strategy to create the 
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appearance of devolving power while in reality strengthening the position of central elites. 
She argues that central regimes either seek to co-opt local elites for their own regime-
building purposes (‘elite capture’) or ensure that any threatening local elites are usurped to 
make way for agents of the central state within their areas (‘recentralisation’).20 Kenya has 
experienced an earlier form of decentralisation that fits this ‘deconcentrated’ logic. President 
Daniel arap Moi’s District Focus for Rural Development scheme in 1982 intensified the 
centre’s local power, particularly to undermine former President Jomo Kenyatta’s allies.21 In 
other ways, the country’s political system has involved decentralised resources. For instance, 
the 2003 creation of the Constituency Development Fund by President Mwai Kibaki 
devolved 2.5% of national revenues for MPs to develop their constituencies, seeking to 
formalise the existing culture of harambee (self-help) schemes.22 However, today’s political 
and administrative devolution, is a far more substantial version of decentralisation. Its 
constitutional backing, combined with pressures on governors particularly to defend their 
political positions locally, suggest that Kenyan devolution’s strength represents a ‘deviant’ 
case in the African context.23  Focusing on the presidential rerun, this article adds to critiques 
of the recentralisation argument.  
To explore why county-level politicians responded to the rerun as they did, this article 
uses – but also complicates – the concept of ‘political linkages’. Linkages conventionally 
refer to the appeals used by politicians and/or political parties to build relations of 
accountability with voters. The most prominent classifications come from Herbert Kitschelt 
who separates linkages into three forms, while privileging the first two: public policies 
(‘programmatic’), customised selective benefits to specific individuals and groups 
(‘clientelist’) and an individual’s unique personal persuasion skills (‘charismatic’).24 Various 
forms of clientelism are the dominant way in which linkages have been understood in studies 
of sub-Saharan Africa.25 The specifics of clientelist linkages in Kenya appear most clearly in 
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the early work of Joel Barkan who argued that, through the MP position, popular conceptions 
of the role that elected representatives should play are ‘well-defined’: namely, to negotiate 
and extract central state resources for the benefit of local development.26 MPs form clientelist 
linkages with citizens through promising selective material benefits, predominantly to co-
ethnics, in exchange for political support. The distinctive feature is that, given the historic 
centralisation of resources, MPs have long been judged on their ability to be local patrons by 
linking their constituents to state funds held at the centre.27 The MP position has tended to 
dominate understandings writ large of what is expected of Kenya’s elected representatives. 
The introduction of new political offices therefore offers a chance to broaden understandings 
of how politicians seek to connect to voters. First, devolution offers a robust and 
constitutionally-guaranteed mechanism for significant resources to be available locally, 
shifting the geographic parameters of clientelism. The governor’s office controls the majority 
of county funds. Second, however, partly given the historic centralisation of resources, the 
focus on strict clientelism alone has obscured other ways in which politicians seek to link 
with supporters, especially through defending the interests of marginalised communities. This 
article therefore uses the term ‘linkages’ but critiques its use by Kitschelt by including the 
ways – beyond the strict exchange or promise of material goods – in which politicians seek to 
present themselves as responsive local leaders.  
Specifically, linkages are used to make sense of county-level politicians’ actions 
during the rerun period. This includes the linkage appeals made by politicians to citizens, but 
also expands the term to include linkages between politicians at different levels of the 
political landscape.28 This is important because part of local politicians’ calculations in being 
seen as responsive to citizens ties with how they link with national politics, reflecting the 
older centrist logic. Under devolution in particular, county-level politicians (especially 
governors) are required to operate in two political arenas – county and national – both of 
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which connect to how they are viewed locally.29 Elections are understandably the time at 
which linkages receive periodic renewal as politicians use strategies to convince citizens to 
vote for them.30 However, during the rerun period, the elections were over for county-level 
politicians, complicating the basis on which we should understand linkages. A focus on the 
rerun allows for a broader understanding of election periods as both windows of opportunity 
and periods of vulnerability for politicians. In highly competitive political climates such as 
Kenya, the pressure on politicians to defend their right to hold elected office does not 
necessarily subside in the electoral aftermath. Post-election pressure on county-level 
politicians was particularly acute in 2017: the electoral commission judged as at fault in the 
presidential ballot had also administered county-level elections. However, the actions and 
rhetoric of county-level politicians reveal broader popular pressure on them to be seen as 
responsive to their local contexts during the rerun period. In highlighting the varying levels of 
importance placed on the presidential rerun by county-level politicians, and the different 
reasons why, the linkage framework helps to answer the larger question of the overall effect 
of devolution on the saliency of the presidency and the significance of the political centre. 
 
Mobilising the vote  
This section considers the linkage appeals in counties aligned with Jubilee and that supported 
efforts to hold the rerun. It begins by introducing the connections between the presidential 
and county-level races, explains how this encouraged certain patterns of political 
mobilisation locally, and analyses the effect on central power. Kenyatta’s first term in office 
(March 2013-August 2017) had been marked by centralising practices that displayed a hostile 
attitude to the new system of devolved government.31 However, at the outset of the 2017 
election period, such concern appeared diluted as Jubilee sought to utilise county-level 
electoral races to campaign for Kenyatta’s re-election. The effort to consolidate support for 
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Jubilee on county-level tickets appeared to reflect three top-down agendas: to win the 
presidency more comfortably compared to 2013 (when, according to official figures, 
Kenyatta won with only a 0.07% margin),32 to avoid a repeat of the opposition’s 2013 success 
at controlling the majority of county executives, and to help Ruto position allies lower down 
in Jubilee structures ahead of his planned 2022 presidential bid.33 As such, Jubilee’s 
presidential campaign ahead of 8 August included promises that the counties voting for 
Kenyatta, and the county-level politicians helping to deliver that result, would benefit from 
his incumbency, in terms of national government projects and appointed positions.34 The 
benefits of alignment with the centre had influenced campaign messages and perceptions of 
county-level candidates, especially in gubernatorial races. This was especially apparent in 
Jubilee strongholds of former Central and Rift Valley provinces (home to ethnic communities 
from which Kenyatta and Ruto respectively hail). Anne Waiguru’s successful bid for the 
Kirinyaga governorship, for example, was partly credited to perceptions of her ability to 
bring in wealth and investment given an allegedly close relationship with the president. 35 
Similarly, the perceived ability of former cabinet secretary Francis Kimemia to bring 
development to Nyandarua county given his connections to State House was seen to help his 
governorship bid.36  This is not to suggest that clientelist linkages connecting the local level 
to the national were the only form of political mobilisation among county-level politicians 
aligned with Jubilee. On the contrary, linkage formation for local-level elections is 
increasingly separate from the national sphere.37 However, it remained a feature of local 
campaigning which meant that whether they had won or lost, county-level politicians in 
Jubilee’s heartlands had campaigned for their own seats in August’s election partly on the 
logic of being aligned with the national executive. A Kenyatta presidency suddenly in 
jeopardy, on the back of a court ruling declaring the electoral process inadequate, was not 
only a chance to show loyalty but also directly risked their ability to protect their own 
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positions in various ways. This included delivering on those local campaign promises and 
recouping crushing personal campaign costs, but also more literally given that the 
presidential court ruling had sparked a wave of electoral petitions against county-level races 
too.38 Jubilee’s relative success at linking its presidential race with county positions had given 
it many county-level allies that, for these reasons, were motivated to mobilise for the rerun.39 
Jubilee had won 25 out of 47 governor seats (compared to 18 in 2013), 25 senator seats, the 
control of 27 county assemblies and 163 (49%) of MP positions.  
In the absence of county-level elections, campaigning was less intense compared to 
the August vote. However, given the polarised political context of the rerun, it was 
understood that turnout figures would frame the legitimacy of Kenyatta’s last term in office. 
The most active effort to mobilise the vote came from the county-level politicians in Jubilee 
strongholds of Central and much of Rift Valley. Where they had them, Jubilee made MPs 
their main party agents rather than the former campaign teams.40 The ‘UhuRuto Express 
Team’ that included sitting and former county-level politicians was re-mobilised to traverse 
multiple counties,41 while the Murang’a governor Mwangi wa Iria started his own Taifa La 
Jubilee (Jubilee nation) initiative.42 Continuing practices from the August election, public 
resources were used for campaigning.43 For Kenyatta to have a chance at wider legitimacy, 
however, turnout needed to be geographically dispersed outside of the strongholds. 
Campaigning efforts in the 13 swing counties were therefore more illustrative of how the 
promises of nationally-linked incumbency benefits were spread.44  
In swing counties, voter mobilisation focused on the material benefits of alignment 
with a national government that, as a community, there was no possibility of leading. 
Devolution’s first term had created perceptions that the national government could undermine 
the operations of county governments aligned with the opposition. This was especially true 
for northern counties such as Marsabit where, despite the presidency’s remoteness, county 
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elites took seriously the view that it was not worth being an ‘opposition county’ again.45 In 
Turkana, the Jubilee campaign for the rerun was headed by former senator (and unsuccessful 
gubernatorial candidate) John Munyes. His message for the people of Turkana was that, as a 
marginalised county in need of development, it was too risky to be associated with the 
opposition.46 His cabinet nomination in January 2018 rewarded his efforts. Interestingly, 
however, his logic was not dissimilar to the attitude of Turkana’s re-elected ODM governor 
Josphat Nanok, who, directly after the August elections had stated that the election process 
was over, and that Turkana’s residents should maintain peace to allow the county to work 
with the national government on implementing development projects.47 In Bungoma, a 
county considered to be a NASA stronghold, national patronage rewards also motivated 
county-level politicians to mobilise the vote. The Jubilee campaign team there was headed by 
the former governor Ken Lusaka, who had defected to Jubilee ahead of the election and had 
in September been made Speaker of the Senate after losing his gubernatorial seat. The 
pressure to deliver Kenyatta ‘more than 250,000 votes’ during the rerun was seen as 
reciprocation for Lusaka’s important senate position.48  
It is hard to see how Jubilee could have pulled off the controversial rerun without 
mobilisation by several county-level politicians, including those who had lost elections but 
been given appointed positions, and who potentially had much to lose with Kenyatta’s 
presidency in doubt. Even with some likely inflation of turnout figures, 39% overall still 
looked respectable given the context of a one-horse race. The highest turnout figures came 
from the strongholds of Central and Rift Valley (Murang’a, 85% and Elgeyo/Marakwet, 
71%), but even in swing counties with large populations such as Kajiado (42%), Narok 
(38%) and Nyamira (32%), many people appeared to have voted. The use of sub-national 
political agents to mobilise the vote looks similar to how previous Kenyan presidents used 
MPs (along with the executive bureaucracy and civil servants) to campaign for re-election.49 
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However, the larger numbers of sub-national political players created by devolution offered 
Jubilee a greater set of allies who had campaigned partly on the basis of alignment with the 
national level. Although providing only a partial picture of political mobilisation, linkage 
appeals from politicians to citizens, and between local and national politicians, focused on the 
material benefits of alignment with the political centre. These circumstances suggest that, in 
some areas, devolution has the power to strengthen national incumbents, amplifying a 
dynamic of the previous political dispensation when MPs were the only (elected) sub-
national political agents. These counties affirm the well-established view in the literature that 
decentralisation can be used to strengthen the political centre. It is for this reason that more 
in-depth treatment is given to the counties explored below providing evidence that devolution 
in Kenya is a ‘deviant’ case, given its power to challenge the centre. However, the 
comparison demonstrates the important point that decentralisation can create political units 
with varied effects on central power.   
 
From apathy to resistance  
This section explores the different types of linkage appeals apparent in NASA-aligned 
counties that do not support the recentralisation thesis. It begins by introducing the 
connections between the presidential and county-level NASA races and then explores the 
forms of political mobilisation that this helped encourage. The NASA team’s presidential 
campaign had been less cohesively tied with party-affiliated county races compared to 
Jubilee. Fewer resources limited the open patronage promises that had characterised Jubilee’s 
campaign. Additionally, in contrast to Jubilee’s consolidation across down-ballot tickets, 
NASA was united only as an ethnic coalition for the presidential ticket.50 This meant that at 
the county level, candidates from across NASA’s coalition parties competed against one 
another for elective posts.51 County-level candidates’ public support for Odinga’s candidacy 
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ahead of the 8 August vote came from those running on affiliated NASA tickets, reflecting 
the logic of the ethnic coalition at the national level. Such support was therefore mainly 
geographically concentrated in the ‘home areas’ of the coalition’s four main co-principals: 
the former provinces of Nyanza and Western, most of the Coast, and Ukambani.52 Given 
ethnic voting patterns, the presidential race tends to be fairly uncompetitive in much of the 
country. For the 2017 elections, only 13 out of 47 counties were considered to be swing.53 
However, unlike Jubilee, NASA had not campaigned heavily in many of these areas. Thus, 
support for Odinga from county-level candidates came mainly from counties where backing 
the preferred presidential candidate of most local voters was an obvious way to increase a 
candidates’ own legitimacy. In general, Jubilee’s campaign benefited from incumbency such 
that future patronage connected with the presidency was openly promised to county 
candidates if Kenyatta were to be re-elected. Apart from promising more resources for 
devolution, NASA’s messaging was far less explicit on the specific patronage rewards that 
would come from Odinga winning the presidency. 
The implicit logic linking NASA’s presidential campaign with county races during 
the elections shifted somewhat following the August results. While as an opposition 
coalition, NASA had done less well overall compared to 2013, executive seats and county 
assemblies had been won by NASA’s constituent parties in their strongholds, with only two 
exceptions for the governor seat.54 After the court annulled the presidential election, 
successful NASA county-level politicians were in the awkward position of having been 
elected to office, while also being asked to support national allies who were contesting the 
credibility of the entire electoral process. The primary thrust of NASA’s complaint was 
against the IEBC, which it did not trust as a neutral administrative body. NASA’s campaign 
had an anti-status quo message in the run-up to 8 August, but this took on a more concrete 
and effective framing of the need to tackle ‘electoral injustice’ following the court ruling. The 
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intention was to put the contested election of 2017 into an historical perspective that painted a 
picture of a mainly Kikuyu elite refusing to give up power and manipulating democratic 
processes to disenfranchise marginalised communities, especially Odinga’s Luo co-ethnics. 
With limited resources to campaign again and little faith that demands for IEBC reforms 
would be met, NASA’s strategy moved, unevenly, from seeking to mobilise voters, to calling 
for protests against IEBC, to demands for a boycott. 55 All NASA politicians were under 
pressure to participate in this two-staged national campaign, but there was significant local 
variation in response.  
Before Odinga withdrew, there had been limited appetite in NASA areas to mobilise 
for another presidential election. The county elections had already shown that access to 
resources for campaigning did not depend on links to incumbency at the centre. Across 
Jubilee and NASA counties, there was little difference in the way that county incumbents – 
and their rivals – used or promised devolved resources in their own campaigns. This included 
the use of county vehicles, gaining political or financial support from those who had 
benefited from county tenders, making promises for future executive appointments, and 
committing to delivering local development projects.56 Upon being elected, this frenetic local 
political environment placed immediate pressure on county-level politicians (especially 
governors) to deliver on their campaign promises. Following the August results, governors 
were being sworn in, county executives from former administrations were sent home, and 
political wrangling began around the election of county speakers.57 The county campaigns 
highlight a devolved political culture that abuses public resources for electoral purposes.58 
However, the guaranteed availability of local resources suggests that, especially in counties 
which are not aligned with the national incumbents, linkage appeals on access to central 
resources do not play such a strong role. In many counties where the popular vote on 8 
August went overwhelmingly to Odinga, the urgency to begin forming county governments 
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detracted from the national pressure to take part in the confrontation over the rerun, 
highlighting that devolution has brought about sub-national autonomy separate from central 
elites.59  
While all NASA county-level politicians faced local pressures to focus on county 
business, it is important to explore why some counties in NASA strongholds nonetheless took 
on active roles in the national confrontation over the presidential rerun. The following 
sections look at Mombasa and Kisumu counties, where the role of county-level politicians 
highlight linkage appeals that go beyond explicit material resource benefits relying on ties 
with presidential incumbents. Instead, the rerun was used as a chance to be seen as defending 
community interests against a central state that had long marginalised local constituents. Such 
linkage appeals are not new in these areas but are significant because they show the potential 
for devolved structures to provide platforms for resistance politics.  
 
i) Mombasa: defending the coast   
As a county with a strong ODM following, local politicians in Mombasa were expected to 
play a key role in supporting NASA’s resistance to the rerun. Particularly important was the 
role of Governor Ali Hassan Joho, who as deputy leader of ODM seeks to take over the 
national mantle of opposition leadership. Joho’s political activities around the rerun were 
squarely focused on national politics rather than in Mombasa itself. Following the Supreme 
Court ruling, for instance, he immediately flew to Nairobi to stand alongside the NASA 
leadership at their first press conference praising this unprecedented decision. The national 
focus was consistent with Joho’s gubernatorial re-election campaign. Once he had been 
cleared to run by the IEBC back in June, he had announced plans to leave Mombasa 
campaign activities to his ‘ODM lieutenants’ while he went ‘around the country with Baba.’60  
Admittedly, this stance was made easier by a relatively uncompetitive local arena for his re-
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election. 61 However, Joho’s focus on the national arena during the rerun appeared to serve 
two ends, which highlight the opportunities created by governorships to challenge the 
national political arena, as well as the constraints imposed by the two-term gubernatorial 
limit which meant that 2017-2022 would be his last term in the Mombasa seat. 
First, resistance to the rerun offered an opportunity for Joho to build further popular 
support around the anti-Jubilee stance that had characterised his first gubernatorial term. 
Since at least early-2016, Joho’s governorship had been characterised by a theatrical series of 
public spats with the national government. Such altercations were directly with the president 
and the county commissioner (subsequently regional coordinator) Nelson Marwa.62 This 
‘defiant politics’,63 on matters ranging from port investments64 to Joho’s personal security 
detail, 65 boosted the governor’s local popularity during an otherwise disappointing first term 
in county government. In order to deflect attention away from, or even explain, devolution’s 
disappointments, Joho framed the national government’s attacks on him as part of a longer 
historical trend of a state determined to undermine the coast’s potential.66 When it came to the 
rerun, NASA’s framing of the ‘stolen’ 2017 presidential poll as part of a long history of 
‘electoral injustice’ fitted with Joho’s existing stance on the longue durée of central state 
oppression at the coast. Being against the national government was a way to build legitimacy 
as a protector of coastal interests. Second, Joho sought to develop his national profile as a 
possible presidential candidate for the 2022 elections. The popularity gained through 
claiming to defend coastal interests was embedded in a history of the region’s political 
remoteness from the presidency. However, the autonomy displayed by Joho’s politics looked 
to highlight that a strong governorship could also be a gateway to national executive politics. 
In this, he looked to use anti-status quo politics to appeal to a broader national audience, 
especially the quite radical youthful base in Odinga’s Luo heartland which forms the 
country’s key opposition constituency.   
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In an effort to show loyalty to ODM, county-level politicians in Mombasa openly 
supported NASA’s stance on anti-IEBC protests and the vote boycott.67 On 19 October, the 
majority of the 30 elected MCAs held a press conference to this effect.68 Joho’s view, as 
expressed in an earlier interview, was that ‘in a country like Kenya, the national government 
is scared because they know that us leaders can bring people onto the streets’.69 Local 
politicians mobilised their supporters and provided transport; as one MCA put it, ‘we were 
the frontrunners of the street protests, every Friday, that’s what we were doing.’70  However, 
despite local endorsement and facilitation for NASA’s resistance, the protests lacked energy. 
Notably, Joho was not in Mombasa to mobilise momentum, opting to instead appear next to 
Odinga during the height of the protest and vote boycott calls.71 Using Joho’s local political 
networks, Mombasa’s anti-IEBC protests were led by Deputy Governor William Kingi, a 
former academic and newcomer to local politics who, despite his vote-bringing Mjikenda 
identity, was neither a populist nor well-known figure.72 As well as MCAs, Kingi was usually 
joined by area MPs from Mvita (Abdulswamad Nassir) and Likoni (Mishi Mboko), as well as 
the Senator Mohammed Faki. Joho only appeared at one on 11 October, the day after Odinga 
had withdrawn from the race.73 Although Mombasa was perceived as a ‘hotspot’ by police, in 
reality the protestors would either be allowed to demonstrate (as on 9 October) or were 
dispersed by police (as on 13 October, after the government made protests illegal in the 
central business districts of Mombasa, Nairobi and Kisumu).74 Protest groups would re-
group, but by the afternoon hours, the centre of town on the island was usually quiet again.75 
Such subdued activity should not be interpreted to mean a lack of support. Referring to the 
state’s appetite for authoritarian security practices in this part of the country,76 one resident of 
Mombasa stated: ‘at mashinani (grassroots), we were all in support of the protests, but also 
know the reality of police responding with a heavy hand’.77 Support for the boycott was 
underpinned by the widespread view that there was little point in voting on 26 October as the 
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election would be rigged.78 Consequently, on election day, while only one polling station in 
Jomvu constituency saw youths actually frustrate the process, in general most voters stayed 
away from the polling stations.79 
Mombasa displayed both the possibilities and limits of resisting the central state in a 
part of the country that has historically been politically remote from the presidency. The 
national interests of the county leadership to defy the rerun resonated with many local 
residents, but not to the extent of major mobilisation for protests and physical prevention of 
the vote. Along with electoral fatigue, many residents may have also already been satisfied 
by the election process given the high turnover of MCA seats in Mombasa: only eight out of 
30 were re-elected.80 Mombasa’s cosmopolitan population is also likely to be a significant 
factor. Even allowing for the contested reliability of election results, for an ‘opposition zone’, 
Mombasa’s presidential results in 2013 and 2017 showed a fairly high vote share for 
Kenyatta, which could be suggestive of an increasing ‘upcountry’ population unsympathetic 
to NASA’s goals. 81 However, despite this, the rerun offered an opportunity for Joho to use 
linkage appeals based on anti-status quo politics, highlighting how governorships can be used 
as platforms to politically challenge national incumbents directly.   
 
ii) Kisumu: protesting electoral injustice  
In contrast to Mombasa, since independence in 1963 local politics in Kisumu have been 
connected directly to competition for the presidency through the leadership of Raila Odinga’s 
father, Oginga Odinga. Yet it is also from those early days, when Oginga Odinga was pushed 
out of the first government, that Luos have as a community retained a sharp sense of their 
exclusion from central state politics and society.82 Raila Odinga’s efforts to bring the 2017 
presidential election into a wider narrative of historic ‘electoral injustice’ resonated with his 
supporters in Kisumu who have long framed everyday struggles within a broader narrative of 
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being ‘put out in the cold’.83 The counties of former Nyanza province, especially Kisumu, 
were therefore unique in the rerun politics. The local influence of Luo co-ethnic Odinga was 
such that political leaders across positions at the county level faced little choice but to be seen 
as supporting NASA’s national cause, but in doing so, contributed to the extent of resistance 
against the rerun.84 For 2017, the level of police brutality witnessed in Kisumu since the 
August election, including extra-judicial killings, the rape of women, and breaking into 
houses at night, had further localised NASA’s national calls for ‘electoral justice’.85  
County-level politicians were not necessarily frontline organisers in the subsequent 
protests or vote boycott action in Kisumu, but they used their political standing and resources 
to help facilitate a major physical resistance against the central state.86 Such support was 
essential to showing sympathy for perceptions of long-term historical injustices and 
marginalisation. Former area MP (2007-13, Kisumu Rural Constituency) and Kisumu Senator 
(2013-17), Anyang’ Nyong’o won the Kisumu governorship in the August election, having 
defeated the previous governor, Jack Ranguma, at ODM primaries. As the newly-elected 
head of the county, but also a close political ally of Odinga, Nyong’o said at a press 
conference the day before the rerun that he was ‘between the devil and the deep blue sea’ in 
being responsible for how the fresh presidential elections may go ahead in Kisumu.87 The 
days of protests in the previous weeks had been witness to the pressure under which county-
level politicians found themselves. Explaining why county-level politicians must be involved 
in the anti-IEBC protests, one prominent protestor said:  
 
…we will not elect you again if you are not loyal to our party leader…So you must 
be there whether you like it or not, the public are also watching you. Those who are 
not with us, we used to call them ‘the moles’, they were betraying us. Taking 




Indeed, since late September when the anti-IEBC protests began, county-level politicians 
(especially the governor, the Kisumu Central MP and MCAs) had been involved in providing 
logistical organisation, resources and leadership for the anti-IEBC protests, including vans to 
mount loud speakers, water, food and fuel for boda boda (motorbike) drivers wishing to join 
the protests. 89 Regardless of their likely genuine support, sustaining their own local 
legitimacy required such involvement. On MCAs (especially in Kondele and Nyalenda 
wards), one local civil society activist captured this by saying, ‘there is a near-fanatical 
following for Baba here and if your area is asleep, then people would be doubting your 
support to the cause.’90 This pressure also meant that county-level politicians were in a 
difficult position to control the nature of the protests. On at least two occasions, Nyong’o led 
a peaceful protest from the Kondele roundabout to the IEBC offices and back, as large 
contingents of police watched on the sidelines. Yet almost as soon as his convoy sped off, the 
police came out of their stations to begin engaging the crowd.91 Some protestors would even 
hurry the governor away in order to begin the ‘second half’, which would witness physical 
clashes with police. 92 The governor deployed ‘marshals’ to keep the protests peaceful, but to 
little avail,93 while other county politicians expressed concern over the destruction of 
property, especially over looting local supermarkets and sabotaging water pipelines.94 
County-level politicians found themselves between the national figure of Odinga and the 
grassroots pressure that was directly mobilised by his words. To be seen as representing 
community interests, they faced little choice but to continue providing political and financial 
support to resisting the rerun. 
On 10 October, Odinga announced his withdrawal from the rerun and local organising 
in Kisumu took on a new dimension. However, this was to be more than a vote boycott. 
Without Odinga running, the logic became that no elections would take place in Kisumu at 
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all; what transpired was a highly organised effort to prevent the vote on 26 October. On the 
day before, rumours circulated in Kisumu town that people needed to be off the streets by 
11pm.95 When residents woke up on election day, they found a number of measures had been 
put in place to physically guarantee that no voting could take place. This effort was aimed at 
ensuring that no electoral materials could move across the county from constituency tallying 
centres, where they had arrived on 24 October, to polling stations. In Seme constituency, the 
tallying centre was guarded by groups of young men (standing alongside armed police); 
burning tyres and nails were placed on the roads leading out; and any passing vehicles were 
checked for electoral materials.96 In Kisumu Central constituency, padlocks and welding 
machines had been used to lock gates at primary schools intended as polling stations. 
Elsewhere in the constituency, trenches had been dug outside polling stations to prevent any 
vehicles passing.97 As with the protests, county-level politicians had helped to facilitate this 
organisation, as explained by a key grassroots organiser:  
 
We are not going to vote and we need padlocks: where will we get them? And we 
don’t have money, we are not working. So we go to our leader…Ours we took to the 
area MCA, he’s always active. He bought us around 200 and something padlocks, 
and the chain, the big one, so we were using them at the gates.98  
 
This intense climate of intimidation had already meant that almost no IEBC staff turned up to 
their stations. The movement of people within town was also policed, with residents being 
questioned on where they were going and told not to vote.99 By and large, residents were said 
to be ‘more impressed than upset’ by this effort.100 By mid-afternoon on the rerun day, the 
IEBC Chairman Wefula Chebukati announced that the election had been suspended in 
Kisumu, as well as Migori, Siaya and Homa Bay (the country’s four Luo-majority counties), 
due to ‘insecurity issues’.  
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In the context of heavy security deployments in Kisumu, along with Jubilee’s 
determination to gain legitimacy from the rerun, physically preventing the vote from taking 
place was seen locally as a major victory against years of central state oppression. The radical 
spirit of Nyong’o’s words the day before the rerun echoed this feeling. In a room filled with 
international media he declared, ‘if the government subverts the sovereign will of the 
people….then people are entitled to rebel against this government.’101 It is true that county 
politicians did not lead the resistance and Nyanza region has been at the centre of confronting 
state authority in the past.102 However, the political pressure placed on a larger number of 
county-level politicians with the resources and political standing to support protests against 
‘electoral injustice’, combined with less fear that the ‘region will be isolated’ in 
developmental terms given devolved resources, helped to bolster the confidence of those 
leading the resistance in Kisumu.103  
 
Conclusion  
This article has explored the role of county-level politicians during the presidential rerun to 
examine the impact of devolution on reducing the stakes around the presidential election and 
on central power. The rerun set a test for the resilience of the links forged between 
presidential and county campaigns in the run-up to the August election and, by extension, the 
saliency of the presidency without the incentives of county-level elections.  
By comparing Jubilee and NASA counties, the article highlights that different forms 
of linkage appeals played out depending on whether county-level politicians were aligned 
with the political centre or against it. These allegiances shaped the extent to which county-
level politicians were motivated to mobilise over the rerun, and, if and when they did, the 
reasons for doing so. For winning and losing politicians in Jubilee strongholds, a Kenyatta 
presidency in jeopardy imperilled the benefits of links with the political centre, upon which 
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they had implicitly campaigned. This led to a sizable mobilisation effort to get out the vote 
for Kenyatta, demonstrating that linkage appeals in Jubilee areas continued to value access to 
resources from the centre. In NASA areas, however, links between the presidential campaign 
and the counties were less robust after the election. First, many counties lacked the will and 
resources to partake in the national theatrics and focused on forming county governments 
instead. Second, however, the examples of Mombasa and Kisumu showed that the counties 
which participated in rerun politics highlight a different form of linkage appeals that 
prioritised the defence of community interests. These patterns indicate that in a remarkably 
short space of time, the new devolved political offices have become embedded features of the 
local landscape. However, part of what has given them meaning are the tools that have long 
driven mobilisation in Kenya – clientelism and the defence of community interests. Such 
continuities highlight the contradiction that devolution has regionally redistributed power but 
remains empowered by divisive politics.  
Different forms of linkage appeals connecting national and county levels indicate that 
devolution’s effect on central power is not uniform. Jubilee’s effective use of its county-level 
politicians demonstrates that devolution offers the presidential incumbent opportunities to 
strengthen their position when national and county political interests align. At the same time, 
the focus of most NASA counties on their own local governments, combined with the strong 
motivations in Kisumu and Mombasa to support the national opposition, offer two separate 
ways in which Kenyan devolution does not strengthen the power of central incumbents. The 
reproduction of national partisan divides at the county level, however, suggests that 
devolution’s effect on central power is contingent partly on the way that national and county 
political alliances intersect. In the 2013 and 2017 elections, the Kenyatta-Ruto alliance 
brought together the counties of Central and much of the Rift Valley, the heartlands of past 
electoral violence over the presidential race. Given Kenya’s fluid national electoral alliances, 
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and in particular uncertainties over Ruto’s ability to realise his presidential ambitions within 
Jubilee, the political geography of national-county alliances may change for the 2022 
elections. Devolution has, on one level, given enough power to the local arena in ways that 
reduce a focus on the presidential race. However, a lens on the intersection between national 
and county politics indicates that the effect on central power is not necessarily stable. Shifting 
national electoral coalitions in Kenya will, by extension, shape the geography of how 
presidential and county electoral campaigns align. Devolution’s effect on central power may 
therefore change with each electoral cycle. 
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